Threats and strong messages do not result in deterrence.  George Washington famously said, "If we desire to avoid insult, we must be able to repel it; if we desire to secure peace...it must be known that we are at all times ready for war".  Not being ready invites insult.  Unfortunately, being ready is a full-time job.

When Vladimir Putin began his attack to seize Crimea, he did It secure in the knowledge that there would be no NATO ground response.  NATO did move air and naval forces around, but the option of something like a large NATO armored exercise in Poland was not possible. Such a move could have influenced Putin's risk/reward calculation. 

NATO Allies have armor but are not about to do something so provocative without US participation and the United States could not participate.  In October 2013, the United States withdrew its last armor from Europe.  Putin's choice of early 2014 was not a coincidence.

The United States decided to rebuild a ground capability in Europe as evidenced by its actions.  A program initially called the European Reassurance Imitative, later renamed the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI), began to increase and improve US military presence in  Europe, with an emphasis on ground capabilities.  The annual budget requests for EDI beginning in 2016 were $3.6 billion, $4.8 billion, $6.3 billion (upgraded to $6.5 billion by Congress), $5.9 billion, and $4.7 billion.  Beginning in 2017 there was additional money for lethal aid to Ukraine.

In the current crisis, in addition to providing aid to Ukraine, NATO has increased its strength to deter Russian attacks against NATO.  Unlike 2014, the United States has been able to play a major role in this effort.  The widely publicized deployment of the ready brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division conceals a much larger contribution made possible by years of planning and funding in EDI.  Before the end of March, at almost no additional cost, the United States had an armored division in Europe along with a command architecture that could command and control a much larger force.

As part of EDI, the United States put a continuous rotational Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) in Poland.  Additionally, we established a prepositioned set of equipment for another ABCT. The prepositioned set replicates a technique for rapid reinforcement used during the Cold War. The equipment is the same equipment used by units in the United States.  It is maintained by the 405th Field Support Brigade.  When activated, the 405th will draw the equipment and issue it to troops flown in from the United States.  The United States also permanently stationed a division headquarters in Poland.  We reactivated V Corps headquarters at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and, in 2020, put a forward element of this headquarters in Poland.

As the current crisis developed, the V Corps moved the bulk of its headquarters to Europe.  The rotational ABCT in Poland was stopped from rotating back to the States and the already planned deployment of the replacement ABCT went ahead.  Soldiers from an ABCT from the 3d Infantry Division at Fort Stewart, Georgia, were flown to Europe and issued equipment by the 405th Field Support Brigade.  The exercise budget of EDI covers such efforts.  Before the end of March then, at very little additional cost, there were 3 American ABCTs in Europe.  Or another way to look at it, there is an American armored division in Europe.  There is also a command architecture that could command and control a Corps. 

What a difference from 2014!  That is real deterrence. These capabilities could have been used for deterrence during the yearlong Russian build-up.  They were not.  However, once the crisis began, they were quickly called into action, a step only possible because the capabilities already existed. 

Crisis management is much easier when there are capabilities to manage.  Those capabilities don't appear magically-- it takes planning, funding, and tenacity.